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Abstract— This paper studies the sensor placement problem
in a networked control system for improving its security against
cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-
sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker’s
decision is to select f nodes of the network to attack whereas the
detector’s decision is to place f sensors to detect the presence of
the attack signals. In our formulation, the attacker minimizes its
visibility, defined as the system L2 gain from the attack signals
to the deployed sensors’ outputs, and the detector maximizes
the visibility of the attack signals. The equilibrium strategy
of the game determines the optimal locations of the sensors.
The existence of Nash equilibrium for the attacker-detector
game is studied when the underlying connectivity graph is
a directed or an undirected tree. When the game does not
admit a Nash equilibrium, it is shown that the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the game, with the detector as the game leader,
can be computed efficiently. Finally, the attacker-detector game
is studied in a cooperative adaptive cruise control algorithm for
vehicle platooning problem. The existence of Nash equilibrium
is investigated for both directed and undirected platoons and
the effect of the position of the reference vehicle on the game
value is studied. Our results show that, under the optimal sensor
placement strategy, an undirected topology provides a higher
security level for a networked control system compared with
its corresponding directed topology.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Applications of distributed control systems, ranging from
power grids and smart buildings to intelligent transportation
systems, have had a considerable growth. In this direction,
the need to do a rigorous research on the control-theoretic
approaches to the security of these systems against failures
and attacks, considering the physical limitations of the sys-
tem, is seriously felt [22]. Several approaches have been
proposed in the literature to tackle this issue [6], [5], [23],
[17], [15], [14] which are based on the system specifications
and the attack strategy. An active line of research in this
area is to consider the defense mechanism in the control
system as a game between the attacker and the defender
and optimize the actions of the defender against possible
attack strategies. In this direction, the game objective can be
the effect of the attack on the system in which the defender
tries to minimize. However, one can use such game-theoretic
approaches to increase the visibility and awareness of the
attacker’s actions, which the defender tries to maximize, and
the problem introduced in this paper is of this kind. To
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improve such an awareness against cyber-physical attacks,
typically a set of monitoring sensors are deployed in the
network and their outputs are used to monitor the security
status of the system.
In a networked control system, the system designer deter-
mines the location of the monitoring sensors (or detectors).
However, the security level not only depends on the sensors’
locations but also on the nodes selected by the attacker
to inject the attack signals. These decisions are made by
different entities with conflicting objectives. In this paper, the
sensor/attack placement problem is posed as a game between
an attacker and a detector and the equilibrium solution of
the game is used to determine the location of the sensors.
This allows the system designer to anticipate the behavior
of the attacker and decides the location of sensors such that
the impact of the attacker’s decision on the security level is
minimized.
B. Related Work
There is a vast literature on game-theoretic approaches
to the security and resilience of control systems in the
past decade [26]. These approaches vary depending on the
structure of the cyber-physical system or the specific type
of malicious action acting on the cyber layer. In the earlier
approach, at each layer (physical and cyber) a particular
game is defined which emerges the concept of games-in-
games that reflects two interconnected games, one in the
physical layer and the other in the cyber layer where the
payoff of each game affects the result of the other one [16],
[25]. In the latter approach (games based on the type of
malicious action), depending on the type of the adversarial
behavior (active or passive) appropriate game strategy, e.g.,
Nash or Stackelberg, was discussed [7], [10]. In addition
to these approaches, the evolution of some network control
systems are modeled as cooperative games [11] and the
resilience of these cooperative games to the actions of
adversarial agents or communication failures are studied [2],
[1].
C. Contributions
In this paper, we study the sensor placement problem in
a leader-follower networked dynamical system1 for improv-
ing its security against cyber-physical attacks. The sensors
placement problem is posed as a zero-sum game between a
detector and an attacker. The detector’s strategy is to place f
1Leader-follower systems have diverse applications from multi-agent
formation control and vehicle platooning [8] to opinion dynamics in social
networks [4].
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sensors in f nodes of the network to maximize the visibility
of the attacker’s action. The attacker strategy is to select f
nodes to inject its attack signal with minimum visibility to
the sensors. The objective of each player is defined as the L2
gain of the system from the injected signals to the sensors’
outputs. The equilibrium strategy of the detector determines
the location of the sensors.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We characterize the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy
of the attacker-detector game for f = 1 when the
underlying connectivity graph is a directed/undirected
tree. It is shown that this game may not admit a NE
for f > 1, and instead Stackelberg game between the
attacker and detector is analyzed when the detector acts
as the game leader. A low complexity algorithm for
computing the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is
proposed for both directed and undirected trees.
• We apply these results to discuss the security of a
cooperative cruise control algorithm in vehicle platoons.
More specifically, we discuss the existence and value
of Nash equilibrium for the attacker-detector game on
both directed and undirected platoons and the role of
the position of the leading vehicle on the game value.
Our results indicate that the value of the attacker-detector
game over a directed tree is at most equal to that over its
corresponding undirected tree. This observation signifies the
importance of two-way communication links in improving
the security of networked control systems against cyber-
physical attacks. Moreover, our results show that the security
of a platoon, as a function of its leader location, is maximized
when the leader is located at either ends of the platoon for
both directed and undirected topologies.
Remark 1 Our analytically results are established by de-
riving a closed-form expression for the system L2 gain of a
networked control system, via graph-theoretic interpretations
of its underlying connectivity graph, for both directed and
undirected trees.
D. Notations and Definitions
We use Gu = {V, E} to denote an unweighted undirected
graph where V is the set of vertices (or nodes) and E is
the set of undirected edges where (vi, vj) ∈ E if an only if
there exists an undirected edge between vi and vj . Moreover
Gd = {V, E} denotes an unweighted directed graph where
E is the set of directed edges, i.e., (vi, vj) ∈ E if an only
if there exists a directed edge from vi to vj . In this paper,
directed graphs only have unidirectional edges, i.e., if there
exists a direct edge from vi to vj in Gd, then there is no direct
edge from vj to vi. Let |V| = n and define the adjacency
matrix for Gd, denoted by An×n, to be a binary matrix where
Aij = 1 if and only if there is an edge from vj to vi in Gd
(the adjacency matrix will be a symmetric matrix when the
graph is undirected). The neighbors of vertex vi ∈ V in the
graph Gd are denoted by the set Ni = {vj ∈ V | (vj , vi) ∈
E}. We define the in-degree (or just degree for undirected
network) for node vi as di =
∑
vj∈Ni Aij . The Laplacian
matrix of an undirected graph is denoted by L = D − A,
where D = diag(d1, d2, ..., dn). We use ei to indicate the
i-th vector of the canonical basis.
E. Organization Of The Paper
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II
we introduce the mathematical formulation of the attacker-
detector game in a leader-follower consensus dynamics. We
then analyze equlibriums for this game when the underlying
network is an undirected tree, Section III, or a directed
tree, Section IV. Then we apply these results to a vehicle
platooning scenario in Section V. Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we propose a game-theoretic approach to
the security of a leader-follower networked control system.
Consider a connected network G = {V, E} comprised of
a leader (or reference) agent, denoted by v`, and a set of
follower agents denoted by F . The state of each follower
agent vj ∈ F evolves based on the interactions with its
neighbors as
x˙j(t) =
∑
vi∈Nj
(xi(t)− xj(t)). (1)
The state of the leader (which should be tracked by the
followers) evolves with an exogenous reference signal u(t)
as
x`(t) = u(t). (2)
If the graph is connected, the states of the follower agents
will track the reference signal u(t) [20]. We assume without
loss of generality that the leader agent is placed last in the
ordering of the agents. The updating rule of each agent is
prone to an intrusion (or attack).2 More particularly, there
exists an attacker which chooses f nodes in the network
to inject the attack signals to.3 Hence, if the dynamics of
follower vj is influenced by an attacker, it will be in the
following form
x˙j(t) =
∑
vi∈Nj
(xi(t)− xj(t)) + wj(t), (3)
where wj(t) > 0 represents the attack signal. To detect the
presence of the attackers, a defender deploys f dedicated
sensors (or detectors) at f specific follower nodes, denoted
by D. Thus we have
yi(t) = xi(t) if vi ∈ D. (4)
where yi(t) is the output of the sensor (detector) deployed
at follower vi. Aggregating the states of all followers into a
vector xF (t) ∈ Rn−1, and aggregating the attack signals to
2We assume that the leader is not affected by the attacks.
3The number of nodes under attack in practice is unknown and we can
assume f is an upper bound for the number of attacks.
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Fig. 1. An Example of an attacker-detector game with f = 2.
w(t), equations (1) and (2) along with the output measure-
ment yield the following dynamics[
x˙F (t)
x˙`(t)
]
= −
[
Lg L12
0 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
[
xF (t)
x`(t)
]
+
[
0
1
]
u˙(t) +
[
B
0
]
w(t),
y(t) = CxF (t), (5)
where Lg is called the grounded Laplacian matrix (formed
by removing the row and the column corresponding to the
leader), the submatrix L12 of the graph Laplacian captures
the influence of the leader on the followers, Bn×f =
[e1, e2, ..., ef ], and Cf×n = [eT1 ; eT2 ; ...; eTf ]. In words, for
matrices B and C which specify the actions of the attacker
and the detector, respectively, there is a single 1 in the i-
th row (column) of matrix B (C) if the i-th node is under
attack (has a sensor).4 We assume that there exists at least
one attack to the system, i.e., f ≥ 1. When the graph G
is connected, Lg is nonsingular and L−1g is nonnegative
elementwise [21]. An example of the dynamics in (5) is
shown in Fig. 1. In this example, a 2×2 submatrix is chosen
by the attacker and the detector from L−1g which is shown
in bold. Based on (5), the dynamics of the follower agents
are given by
x˙F (t) = −LgxF (t) + L12u(t) +Bw(t),
y(t) = CxF (t). (6)
The following theorem characterizes the system L2 gain from
the attack signal to the output measurement of (6).
Theorem 1 ([20]) The system L2 gain from the attack sig-
nal to the output measurement of (6) is given by
sup
||w||2 6=0
||y||2
||w||2 = σmax(G(0)) = σmax(CL
−1
g B) (7)
where σmax is the maximum singular value of matrix G(0)
and the L2 norm of signal u is ||u||22 ,
∫∞
0
uTudt.
Based on Theorem 1, the attacker-detector game is defined
as follows:
4Note that the action of the attacker is to choose matrix B and the value
of the attack signal w(t) is not a decision variable.
Attacker-Detector Game: We model the interaction
between the attacker and the detector as a zero-sum
security game. In this game, the attacker’s decision
is the location of each attack signal, i.e., the matrix
B and the detector’s decision is the location of
sensors, i.e., matrix C. The attacker’s objective is
to reduce the visibility of the attack signal at the
output by minimizing the system L2 gain (7) whereas
the detector’s objective is to increase the visibility of
the attack signal at the output by maximizing the L2
gain.
Based on the definition above, the attacker-detector game
is a matrix game. For the case f = 1, the well-known matrix
game is formed with the payoff matrix equal to [L−1g ]ij ≥ 0.
When f > 1, the payoff will be the largest singular value of
the nonnegative matrix CL−1g B.
Remark 2 The reason of choosing L2 gain (7) as the game
payoff is that the attacker is willing to be as stealthy as
possible by minimizing the largest system norm (worst case
gain from its perspective) over all frequencies. Having this
attitude from the attacker, the detector tries to maximize this
payoff.
Next lemma states a property of the non-negative matrices
which is helpful in the equilibrium analysis of the attacker-
detector game.
Lemma 1 ([12]) The largest singular value of a nonnega-
tive matrix M is a non-decreasing function of its entries.
Moreover, if M is irreducible, its singular value is strictly
increasing with its entries.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF THE
ATTACKER-DETECTOR GAME: UNDIRECTED TREES
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium of the attacker-
detector game on undirected trees. We first provide an
explicit characterization of L−1g , for undirected trees, in
terms of the properties of its underlying connectivity graph.
This result is helpful in our equilibrium analysis and allows
us to investigate the game value. The proof of this result is
presented in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Gu is an undirected tree and let Pi`
be the set of nodes involved in the (unique) path from the
leader node v` to vi (including vi). Then we have
[L−1g ]ij = |Pi` ∩ Pj`|. (8)
According to this lemma, the (i, j)th element of L−1g is equal
to the number of common edges between the path from the
leader to the node vi and the path from the leader to the
node vj . As an example, |P3` ∩ P6`| = 1 for nodes 3 and 6
and |P3` ∩ P4`| = 2 for nodes 3 and 4 in Fig. 2 (a).
A. Equilibrium Analysis: f = 1
In the single attacker-detector case, i.e., B = ei and C =
eTj for some 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the system L2 gain will become
eTj L
−1
g ei = [L
−1
g ]ij , (9)
where [L−1g ]ij is the ij-th element of L
−1
g .
The following theorem establishes the existence of NE for
the attacker-detector game with f = 1.
Theorem 2 Let Gu be an undirected tree and v` be the leader
node. Then, for f = 1,
(i) The attacker-detector game admits at least one NE if v`
is not a cut vertex and the game value is 1 for all NE
in this case.
(ii) The game does not admit any NE if v` is a cut vertex.
Proof: For part (i), the NE belongs to the case where the
attacker (the minimizer) chooses the column corresponding
to the leader’s neighbor. According to Lemma 2 since all
elements of this column are all 1, then, regardless of the ac-
tions of the detector, the game payoff will be 1. Moreover, if
the attacker chooses a node other than the leader’s neighbor,
the payoff will be at least 1. Hence, not the attacker, nor the
detector have an incentive to change their strategy. For part
(ii), if the leader is removed, the graph will be splitted into
two parts and the resulting grounded Laplacian matrix, and
consequently L−1g , become block diagonalized. Assume that
a NE exists in this case and let (i∗, j∗) denote the equilibrium
strategies of the attacker and detector. Thus, we should have
[L−1g ]ij∗ ≤ [L−1g ]i∗j∗ ≤ [L−1g ]i∗j (10)
for all i 6= i∗ and j 6= j∗. If element [L−1g ]i∗j∗ is in one of the
zero blocks, as shown in Fig. 2 (b), then the left inequality
will be violated and if it is in one of the nonzero blocks, the
right inequality will be violated.
B. Equilibrium Analysis: f > 1
For f > 1, the attacker-detector game deos not admit
a Nash equilibrium in general as shown in the following
example.
Example 1 In Fig. 2 (c) for the case of f = 2, it is clear,
according to Lemma 1, that one of the choices of the attacker
is node 1. Then for the second choice, both attacker and
detector should choose from the blocks of all 1 or the red
blocks. Thus, similar to the proof of part (ii) of Theorem 2,
there would be no NE for the game. In Fig. 2 (d) there exists
a NE for f = 2.
C. Stackelberg Game Approach f > 1
According to the Example 1, a NE may not exist for
general trees. More formally, the following equality does not
hold in general
min
B
max
C
σmax(CL
−1
g B) = max
C
min
B
σmax(CL
−1
g B).
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Fig. 2. (a) An undirected tree with its three paths to leader v`, (b) An
undirected tree where v` is a cut vertex, (c) An undirected tree which does
not admit NE for f = 2, (d) n undirected tree with a NE for f = 2, (e) A
directed tree with NE for f = 2, (f) A directed tree which does not admit
NE for f = 2.
In this case, we study the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy
of the attacker-detector game when the detector acts as
the game leader and the attacker acts as the follower. In
the Stackelberg game formulation, the leader solves the
following optimization problem
J∗(C) = max
C
σmax
(
CL−1g B
∗(C)
)
. (11)
where B∗(C) is the best response of the attacker when the
strategy of the detector is C, i.e., B∗(C) is the solution of
the following optimization problem
B∗(C) = arg min
B
σmax
(
CL−1g B
)
. (12)
In particular, for a given strategy of the detector, i.e., C,
the attacker finds its best response strategy to the detector’s
decision, which is given by minB CL−1g B. Then, the detec-
tor optimizes its decision based on all possible best response
strategies of the attacker. Unlike the NE, a Stackelberg game
always admits an equilibrium strategy.
In general, the computation complexity of solving (11)
is O
((
n
f
)2)
. That is, the attacker needs to solve (12) for
all possible choice of f victim nodes. Then, the detector
selects the sensor placement strategy which maximizes (12).
However, based on properties of the grounded Laplacian
matrix, we propose an algorithm for finding the Stackelberg
equilibrium with much less computational cost. This algo-
rithm, in a nutshell, is that both attacker and detector identify
all m leader-rooted paths5 in G. Then for each partition
of f into m nonnegative values f1, f2, ..., fm, the detector
(attacker) places fi sensors (attacks) to fi farthest (closest)
nodes to the leader in the i-th leader rooted path (i.e., there
is no computational cost for the placement of attacks and
detectors for a given partitioning). The proposed algorithm
for solving the Stackelberg game is shown in Algorithm 1.
As it will be shown in Theorem 3, the complexity of this
algorithm does not scale with the network size.
5A leader-rooted path in a tree is a unique path starting from the leader
and ends at a node with degree 1.
Algorithm 1 Stackelberg Attacker-Detector Game on Undi-
rected Trees.
// Inputs: G(V, E), f
J∗ ← 0Sf,m , where Sf,m is the number of solutions of
(13).
for i = 1 : Sf,m do
for j = 1 : Sf,m do
B∗(Ci) = arg minBj σmax(CiL
−1
g Bj)
end for
J∗i = σmax
(
CiL
−1
g B
∗(Ci)
)
end for
// Output: C∗ = arg maxCi J
∗
i
Theorem 3 Consider the Stackelberg attacker-detector
game, with the detector as the game leader, over the
connected tree Gu with leader node v` and m leader rooted
paths. Then, Algorithm 1 finds the Stackelberg equilibrium
of the game. Moreover, its computational complexity is
O
(
S2f,m
)
, where Sf,m is the number of constrained
partitions of f into m nonnegative integers, i.e., the integer
solutions of
f =
m∑
i=1
fi, 0 ≤ fi ≤ `i, (13)
where `i is the length of the i-th leader rooted path.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we label the nodes
in a tree in the following form. We start labeling the nodes a
leader rooted path from the leader neighbor, node 1, to a leaf,
called `1. Then we continue from another leader rooted path
which has maximum sharing nodes with the previous leader
rooted path can label that from `1 + 1 to the leaf called `2.
We continue labeling until all nodes are labeled and the leaf
of the last leader rooted path is called `m. For the proof, it is
sufficient to show that fi attackers (fi detectors) have to be
placed in the first (last) fi columns (fi rows) of partition i.
We prove this by contradiction for placing the attack signals
and the detector case it follows the same discussion. Let’s
denote Ci to be the set of columns from `i + 1 to `i+1. By
contradiction, suppose there exists at least one column Cji of
Ci where j < fi which is not chosen by an attacker. Since
in this case there exists another column Chi , h > j which
is chosen by an attacker and, as a consequence of Lemma
2, each elements of Cji is smaller than or equal to C
h
i , this
contradicts the optimal strategy of the attacker and the proof
is complete.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF THE
ATTACKER-DETECTOR GAME: DIRECTED TREES
In this section, we investigate the existence of equilibrium
for the attacker-detector game, when the underlying network
is a directed tree. We present the following assumption.
Assumption 1: In directed tree Gd each follower vi can be
reached through a directed path from leader v`.
Similar to Lemma 2, we derive a closed-from expression
for the inverse of grounded Laplacian matrix L−1g for the
directed case. This result is presented in the next lemma and
its proof is presented in Appendix B.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Gd is a directed tree with the leader
node v` satisfying Assumption 1. Then, the entries of the
matrix L−1g are given by
[L−1g ]ij =
{
1 if there is a directed path from j to i,
0 if there is no directed path from j to i.
(14)
A. Equilibrium Analysis: f = 1
The following theorem discusses the existence of NE for
the attacker-detector game with dynamics (6) on directed
trees when f is equal to 1.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Gd is a directed tree with the leader
node v` satisfying Assumption 1. Then, the attacker-detector
game does not accept a NE f = 1 except when Gd is a
directed path.
Proof: We know that L−1g is a lower triangular matrix
with diagonal elements equal to 1, due to the fact that
the diagonal elements of L−1g in this case are the inverses
of the in-degrees of the nodes and the in-degree of each
node is 1. Thus, there exists at least one element 1 in each
row and column of L−1g . Moreover, based on Lemma 3,
L−1g is a binary matrix. A NE state should satisfy (10). If
[L−1g ]i∗j∗ = 0 then the left inequality in (10) will be violated
and if [L−1g ]i∗j∗ = 1 the right inequality is violated unless
the elements in the i∗-th row are all 1. This means, based
on Lemma 3, that there must be a directed path from any
node to node vj∗ and this means that vj∗ is at the end of a
directed path graph which yields the result.
B. Equilibrium Analysis: f > 1
Similar to the case of undirected trees, for directed trees
when f > 1 we may or may not have NE in general, as
shown in the following example.
Example 2 It can be easily checked that the attacker-
detector game over the directed tree with f = 2 shown in
Fig. 2 (e) has a NE, whereas it does not admit a NE over
the graph in Fig. 2 (f). It is because of the fact that the
attackers chooses its target nodes from nodes 2, 3, 4, since
the first column of L−1g is all 1 and choosing it will result in
a larger payoff (Lemma 1). As the detector tries to maximize
the payoff, it will also choose from these three nodes. Thus
the corresponding block in L−1g is an identity matrix which
does not admit a NE.
C. Stackelberg Game Approach f > 1
Although for many directed trees there is no NE, similar
to the case of undirected trees, we can show that performing
the Stackelberg max-min game does not cost much compu-
tational effort.
Theorem 5 Let Gd be a directed tree with leader node v`
and m leader rooted paths satisfying Assumption 1. Then the
objective function (12) can be solved within S2f,m iterations,
where Sf,m is the number of constrained partitions of f into
m nonnegative integers, i.e., the integer solutions of (13).
Proof: The procedure of the proof is similar to that of
Theorem 3. However, in this case the attackers or detectors
selected for each partition i, called fi, are placed in the end
of the partition.
The following theorem compares the value of the attacker-
detector game when the underlying networks are directed
and undirected trees. The proof is straightforward based on
Lemmas 2 and 3 as well as the monotonicity of the largest
singular value, mentioned in Lemma 1.
Theorem 6 Let Gd be a directed tree with leader node v`
and Gu be its corresponding undirected graph (by removing
directions from the edges). Let the value of the Stackelberg
game between f attackers and detectors on Gd and Gu be Jd
and Ju, respectively. Then we have Jd ≤ Ju.
V. APPLICATION TO SECURE PLATOONING
In this section, we consider a network of connected
vehicles and study the attacker-detector game for its co-
operative adaptive cruise control dynamics. In this setting,
the objective for each follower vehicle is to track a refer-
ence velocity (computed by the leader vehicle to optimize
a certain objective, e.g., fuel consumption [9]) while the
vehicle remains in a safe distance from its neighboring
vehicles. We use the results of the previous sections to study
the existence of NE for the attacker-detector game in the
platooning application and its corresponding game value.
Note that the underlying connectivity graph is a line in the
platooning application. This property allows us to provide
a more detailed equilibrium analysis of the attacker-detector
game for the vehicle platooning application compared with
the attacker-detector game over trees.
Consider a connected network of n vehicles. The position
and longitudinal velocity of each vehicle vi is denoted by
scalars pi(t) and ui(t), respectively. Each vehicle vi is able
to communicate with its neighbor vehicles and transfer its
kinematic parameters, e.g., velocity. 6 The desired vehicle
formation will be determined by specific constant inter-
vehicular distances. Let ∆ij denote the desired distance
between vehicles vi and vj . The desired vehicle formation
and velocity tracking is schematically shown in Fig. 3.
Considering the fact that each vehicle vi has access to its
own position, the positions of its neighboring vehicles, and
the desired inter-vehicular distances ∆ij , the dynamics of
vehicle vi can be expressed as [8]
p¨i(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
kp (pj(t)− pi(t) + ∆ij)
+ku (uj(t)− ui(t)) + wi(t), (15)
6Transmitting vehicle’s states such as velocity is common in standard
short-range vehicular communications [24].
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Fig. 3. Desired inter-vehicular distances ∆ij and velocity u` in a
cooperative adaptive cruise control strategy.
where kp, ku > 0 are control gains and wi(t) models a
possible signal attack. The dimension of the attack signal is
the same as the dimension of acceleration. This physically
means that the attacker, in addition to the defined feedback
protocol, applies an additive traction force Fi(t) = Miwi(t)
to vehicle vi, where Mi is the mass of vi. Dynamics (15) in
matrix form become
x˙(t) =
[
0n In
−kpLg −kuLg
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
x(t) +
[
0n×1
kp∆
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+
[
0n
B
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
w(t),
y(t) = [0n C]x(t) (16)
where x = [P P˙]T = [p1, p2, ..., pn, p˙1, p˙2, ..., p˙n]T, ∆ =
[∆1,∆2, ...,∆n]
T in which ∆i =
∑
j∈Ni ∆ij . Here w(t) is
the vector of attacks and y(t) is the vector of sensor mea-
surements. The reason of choosing such an output is that the
vehicle longitudinal velocity is available in real-time through
either direct GPS measurements or from the estimation with
an acceptable accuracy [18]. In order to find the transfer
function from the attack signal to the measurements, we take
Laplace transform from the acceleration part, second row of
(16), assuming zero initial condition, which yields
s2X(s) = −kpLgX(s)− skuLgX(s) +BW (s), (17)
where X(s) and W (s) are Laplace transforms of x(t) and
w(t), respectively. This results in
Y (s) = CX(s) = C
s2I + (sku + kp)Lg︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯(s)

−1
BW (s),
(18)
Note that the system (16) is no longer positive and its L2
gain happens at some nonzero frequency. However, since a
vehicle has a large mass and inertia, an informed attacker
will not inject a high frequency attack signal in this system.
This is because the attack signal changes the acceleration and
it is impossible to change a vehicle’s acceleration abruptly
due its large mass. As a result, a high frequency attack signal
can be easily detected by inspecting the received information
from the neighboring vehicles. Therefore, in what follows,
we assume that the attack signal is slowly varying in time.
Under this assumption, we study the attacker-detector game
for (16) when the attacker’s objective is to minimize the zero
frequency of the transfer function whereas the defender’s
objective is to maximize this quantity. More formally, the
objective function of each player in can be written as
G(0) = CA¯(0)−1B =
1
kp
CL−1g B, (19)
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Fig. 4. Matrix canonical structure for the undirected (a) and directed (b)
path graphs.
In the following subsections we investigate the existence
of NE for the attacker-detector game in vehicular platoons
where the inter-vehicular communications can be directed or
undirected. Moreover, we discuss the effect of the position
of the leading vehicle, i.e., leader placement, on the game
payoff.
A. Undirected Platoon
The following proposition discusses the existence of NE
for the attacker-detector game in a platoon of vehicles over
an undirected path graph (symmetric interactions).
Proposition 1 let Gu be an undirected path graph, corre-
sponding to a platoon of vehicles, with leader vehicle v`
in one end of the path. Then, for any f ≥ 1, the attacker
detector game admits at least one Nash equilibrium for game
(19) which happens when the attacker chooses f closest
nodes to the leader and the detector chooses farthest f nodes
from the leader.
Proof: Based on a specific structure of L−1g for this
topology, as shown in Fig. 4 (a), the NE is obtained when
the attacker chooses first f columns of L−1g and the detector
chooses last f rows of L−1g . If we denote such row and
column selections by the attacker and detector by B∗ and
C∗, according to Lemma 1, it is easy to verify that
σmax(CL
−1
g B
∗) ≤ σmax(C∗L−1g B∗) ≤ σmax(C∗L−1g B)
(20)
where C and B are any combination of f rows and columns
of L−1g , respectively. In words, any unilateral deviation of
the attacker’s decision will result in increasing the ele-
ments of C∗L−1g B
∗, which in turn results in increasing
σmax(C
∗L−1g B) (based on lemma 1). Moreover, if n ≤
2f then any unilateral deviation of the detector’s choice
decreases σmax(CL−1g B
∗). For n > 2f the unilateral change
in detector’s selection may not change the game payoff (the
elements of CL−1g B remain unchanged) which results in
multiple NEs with the same value.
1) Interplay Between Leader Placement and Security:
Here, we study the impact of the leader’s location in a
platoon of vehicles on the value of the attacker-detector
game. To study the impact of the leader placement, we use
the Stackelberg formulation of the attacker-detector game.
This is because the fact that the attacker-detector game may
not admit a NE if the leader is a located at a cut vertex of
the underlying connectivity graph (based on Theorem 2).
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Fig. 5. A path graph with two leader positions and their corresponding
Nash states.
Theorem 7 Consider the Stackelberg attacker-detector game
for a platoon of vehicles over an undirected path. Let J1 and
J2 denote the corresponding game values when v` is not at
the head of the platoon and when v` is at the head of the
platoon, respectively. Then, we have J1 ≤ J2.
Proof: We label the nodes from one head to the other
such that for case 1 (when the leader is in the middle of the
platoon), the leader is node k and for case 2 the leader is
node n. Define A1 = CL−1g1 B and A2 = CL
−1
g2 B where Lg1
and Lg2 are grounded Laplacian matrices corresponding to
case 1 and 2, respectively. For fix and identical matrix C for
both cases, we show that a1ij ≤ a2ij , where a1ij and a2ij are
ij-th elements of A1 and A2, respectively. Then for C∗ =
arg maxC minB CL
−1
g1 B which gives the optimal payoff for
the max-min game in case 1, we see that this C∗ provides
even larger payoff in case 2, which proves the claim. To
prove a1ij ≤ a2ij for all i, j = 1, 2, ..., n, we use contradiction.
Note that the i-th row in matrices A1 and A2 are chosen
from the same row index in L−1g1 and L
−1
g2 , since C is fixed
to be the same for both cases. Two possibilities: (1) a1ij is
chosen from columns 1 to k in matrix L−1g1 . In this case
a1ij > a
2
ij (negation of the claim) means that a
1
ij is chosen
from column j1 and a2ij is chosen from column j2 where
j1 > j2. Thus either there exists a free column (column
which is not chosen by the attacker) in L−1g1 in the left hand
side of j1 (which contradicts the optimality of the attacker’s
strategy), or there is no free column in the left side of j1
and since all columns 1, 2, ..., j2 in L−1g2 are chosen by the
optimal attacker, it results in j1 = j2 and since [L−1g1 ]ij ≤
[L−1g2 ]ij , then the initial assumption a
1
ij > a
2
ij is not true.
(2) a1ij is chosen from columns k + 1 to n. In this case, if
j1 = k + 1, then we have a1ij ≤ a2ij for all j2 = 1, 2, ..., n
which contradicts the assumption. If j1 > k + 1, the proof
is similar to case (1).
According to the above theorem, the game value of the
attacker-detector game, in a platoon of vehicles, decreases if
the leader is moved to an intermediate position in the platoon.
We note that it has been shown that changing the leader’s
position improves the robustness of the platoon dynamics to
the communication disturbances [19]. However, our results
show that a platoon of vehicles will be more secure when
the leader is located at the head of the platoon.
B. Directed Platoon
The role of communication direction on the performance
and disturbance rejection in vehicle platooning has been
addressed in the literature, under the name of predecessor-
following architecture [8]. In this subsection we analyze the
security of this platoon topology, which is shown in Fig. 5,
bottom. The following proposition discusses the existence of
NE in directed platoons.
Proposition 2 Consider the attacker-detector game in a pla-
toon of vehicles over a directed communication graph. Then,
for any f ≥ 1, there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game
which belongs to the case where both the attacker and the
detector choose farthest f nodes from the leader.
Proof: Due to the specific structure of L−1g , which is a
lower triangular matrix with all triangle elements equal to 1,
Fig. 4 (b), the NE corresponds to the case where the detector
is choosing the last f rows and the attacker chooses last f
columns. Then by changing the choices unilaterally by the
attacker and detector and considering Lemma 1 the NE is
confirmed to exist.
Remark 3 (Discussion on the Value of NE): It can be eas-
ily shown that the game value of the attacker-detector game
for the platoon of vehicles in the undirected communication
case is higher than that with directed communication. This
shows that undirected platoon is a more secure structure than
the directed platoon. Moreover, it can be shown that the best
position of the leader in the undirected platoon from the
detector’s perspective is the case where the leader is on the
head of the platoon.
VI. CONCLUSION
An attacker-detector game on a leader-follower network
control system was studied, in which the attacker tries to
minimize its visibility and the detector aims to maximize
it. The game payoff was the system L2 gain from the
attack signal to the measurable outputs. Several conditions
for the existence and the value of Nash equilibrium on both
directed and undirected trees were studied. Moreover, the
problem was studied under the Stackelberg game framework
and it was shown that this game can be solved with low
computational cost for large scale networks. At the end, these
results were applied to vehicular platooning and the optimal
network topology and leader position were investigated. A
rich avenue for further studies is to extend these results
from trees to more general topologies and heterogeneous
communication weights.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Before proving Lemma 2 we need some preliminary
definitions.
A extension of the above theorem was presented in [13].
Before that, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 A spanning subgraph of a graph G is called a
2-tree of G, if and only if, it has two components each of
which is a tree. In other words, a 2-tree of G consists of two
trees with disjoint vertices which together span G. One (or
both) of the components may consist of an isolated node. We
refer to tab,cd as a 2-tree where vertices a and b are in one
component of the 2-tree, and vertices c and d in the other.
Based on the above definition, we prove Lemma 2.
Proof: From [3] we know that any first order cofactor
(principal minor) of the Laplacian matrix L is equal to
the number of different spanning trees of the connected
graph G. Moreover, from [13] we know that the second
order cofactor cof(L)ij,`,` of the Laplacian matrix L is the
number of different 2-trees tij,`` in the connected graph G.
We know that [L−1g ]ij =
cof(L)ij,`,`
det(Lg)
. and since G is a tree
(with one spanning tree) we have det(Lg) = 1 which yields
[L−1g ]ij = cof(L)ij,`,`. Moreover, in G as a tree, the number
of 2-trees tij,`` is equal to the number of trees which contain
vi and vj and do not contain v` and that is equal to |Pi`∩Pj`|
which proves the claim.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Let Lgd and Lgu be grounded Laplacian ma-
trices of a directed tree and its undirected counterpart,
respectively. The proof is based on the fact that for a directed
tree with one leader node v` we have LTgdLgd = Lgu (proved
in [19]) which results in L−1gd L
−T
gd
= L−1gu . Based on Lemma
2, we have [L−1gu ]ij = |Pi` ∩ Pj`| which gives
[L−1gu ]ij = |Pi` ∩ Pj`| = [L−1gd ]i[L−1gd ]Tj (21)
where [L−1gd ]i is the i-th row of L
−1
gd
. Now consider another
node vk in G. If there is a directed path from vk to vi for
some vk ∈ V , we set the k-th element of [L−1gd ]i equal to 1
and zero otherwise and doing the same work for row [L−1gd ]j .
If vk ∈ Pi` ∩ Pj` in the undirected graph, then the k-th
elements of both [L−1gd ]i and [L
−1
gd
]j are 1 and likewise if we
consider all elements of Pi`∩Pj`, then equality (21) will be
satisfied and since it should hold for all i, j = 1, 2, ..., n−1,
this solution will be unique.
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